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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the closing sentence of his call for a new paradigm in port studies, 
Robinson issues the following challenge: “the role of ports and the way in 
which ports position themselves in the new business environments beyond 
2001 must be defined within a paradigm of ports as elements in value-driven 
chain systems, not simply as places with particular, if complex, functions” 
(2002: 252). Recent research on the maritime shipping industry has focused 
upon the emergence of more integrated logistics chains, both within the 
maritime industry itself and between maritime- and land-based 
transportation modes (Slack at al, 2002; Notteboom, 2002). Greater 
integration of logistics chains raises difficult questions for ports and port-
cities seeking to secure or maintain dominant positions within global trade 
flows (Notteboom & Winklemans, 2001; Heaver et al, 2001). The attention 
to integration along logistics chains parallels and indeed draws upon the 
wider literature on global commodity chains (Gereffi, 1994; Gereffi et al, 
2005) and supply chains (Cox et al, 2002). 
 
The logistics chain perspective indicates that ports should seek to insert 
themselves as privileged nodes within particular logistics chains. While we 
do not disagree with this general policy conclusion, in this paper we show 
that the potential for conflict and uncertainty over goals, roles and actions 
with respect to supply chain insertion increases significantly when we 
rescale the analysis in two dimensions; namely, when move from the port to 
the port-city and the nation, and from the logistics to the whole supply chain. 
While recognising the close connections between them, for clarity we 
distinguish between logistics chains which deal with the distribution of 
goods in physical space, and value chains which deal with inter-firm 
relationships in economic space. We use the term supply chain to encompass 
both. However, with some exceptions, few attempts have been made to nest 
the analysis of logistics chains within the larger supply chains in which they 
are located. We argue that this analytical bracketing may potentially lead to 
incorrect policy advice. 
 
Using a case study of the attempts since 1994 to insert Durban into global 
automotive supply chains, we trace the debate and conflict over what 
logistics functions to serve in which value chain. We show that this conflict 
results not only from the tensions within or between competing value and 
logistics chains, but also from the tensions between parallel local and 
national decision-making arenas. At the local level, port planning and day-
to-day port management are not coordinated with city planning and 
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economic development functions (Hall & Robbins, 2002). At the national 
level, port policy is caught up in the privatisation and transformation of the 
national transport agency, while automotive sector policies reflect national 
industrial goals. This decision-making environment seriously complicates 
the goal of rapid agreement and alignment around supply chain insertion. 
 
The paper consists of a short section which presents the conceptual 
framework and key concepts used in the paper, highlighting the policy 
challenges raised for ports and port-cities by introducing scale into the 
supply chain perspective. The bulk of the paper is devoted to the second 
section which contains the case study. Here we nest the analysis of 
automobile imports and exports moving through the port of Durban within 
the wider port-city and national development context. The paper concludes 
with a brief conclusion. 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: LOGISTIC, VALUE AND SUPPLY 
CHAINS IN SCALE 
 
The goals of actors operating within supply chains, if not the precise 
strategies they may employ or the nature of the regimes governing specific 
chains, are relatively clear. First, actors seek to insert themselves into supply 
chains. Supply chains provide actors with access to technology, capital, 
supplies, expertise, and markets, and most importantly, to knowledge about 
these critical resources (Gereffi, 1994). For ports, the goal of logistic chain 
insertion has been pursued through improved landside connections, 
incentives, leases and concessions to attract more port callers, and port 
networking (see Heaver, 1995; Notteboom & Winklemans, 2001). National 
and local economies seek to insert themselves into what are, at least in the 
automobile sector, value chains that dominated by a decreasing number of 
global players (Sturgeon & Florida, 2000). With respect to the case study 
that follows, Morris at al wrote that “(i)f Toyota SA is to compete in the 
long term, it needs better access to Toyota Japan’s global networks, and it 
similarly needs to help facilitate significant export contracts for its domestic 
component suppliers” (2002: 125). 
 
Second, actors seek appropriate integration within supply chains in order to 
reduce overall transactions costs and provide services more efficiently. This 
implies that actors, including ports, within a given supply chain should 
cooperate in order to out-compete other chains. This perspective is the raison 
d'être of supply chain management as a field of practice. Transaction costs 
Inserting Durban into global automotive supply chains 4 
 
reasoning has been applied to explain vertical integration in the maritime 
sector (Panayides, 2002) and has informed much of the World Bank and 
UNCTAD work on port reform (Bichou and Gray, 2004). Another form of 
greater integration within supply chains is the upgrading of productive 
capacity through a variety of (often collective and local) learning, innovating 
and harmonising processes (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Coe et al, 2004). 
 
Third, however, while the heightened integration predicted by the 
transactions cost approach may be applicable to some parts of the logistics 
industry, it does not accurately account for the observed diversity in the 
governance of supply chains (Cox, et al, 2002; Gereffi et al, 2005). What the 
‘power perspective’ highlights is that supply chain actors will also seek to 
secure advantage over each other by developing critical assets / supply chain 
capacities. This is because each actor in a supply chain is in some sense in 
competition with every other actor over the value that may be extracted from 
what are essentially uncompetitive economic systems (Cox et al 2002). 
Supply chains are thus inherently unstable, and subject to competition from 
within as well as from without. Hence, Robinson (2002) asks which critical 
assets a port must secure in order to enjoy some power when negotiating 
with steamship lines and other users of port services, while local (and 
national) economies seek benefits when bargaining with inward investors 
(Yeung & Li, 1999). 
 
We summarise the three goals of actors with respect to supply chains as 
insertion, integration and dominance, recognising the tensions that exist 
between these goals as well as the competition between the actors. In order 
to understand how these goals play out in ports and the city-regions that host 
them, it seems to us that there are two further challenges. First, we need to 
re-scale the port, and second, we need to pay close attention to the nature of 
particular supply chains and the specific character of the actors which 
populate them. 
 
By recognising that ports are elements in supply chains, we are implicitly 
recognising that they exist in relation to actors and processes that operate 
within, across and between multiple spatial scales. In this sense, the 
challenge facing us is the same challenge which economic globalisation 
presents to all contemporary spatial-economic analysis and policy (Dicken, 
2003). Economic geographers may reduce such multi-scalar analyses to the 
tension between the local and the global scales (Lipietz, 1993), although the 
definition of the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ may vary from one context to 
another. For example, global trading regions and the sub-port terminal scale 
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intersect in Olivier and Slack’s (forthcoming) argument that the global 
terminal operating firm is currently a prime agent of port change. Likewise, 
in studies more directly concerned with global production chains, Humphrey 
and Schmitz (2002) ask whether insertion into global value chains leads to 
upgrading of local industrial clusters, while Coe et al (2004) ask whether 
regional institutions allow favourable ‘strategic coupling’ between local 
firms and global production networks. 
 
It is also important to recognise that we have been using the term supply 
chain to apply to what are in fact a diverse group of historically contingent 
and unique formations (Hall, 2004). As indicated above, we have reduced 
this diversity in supply chains to two ideal types; the logistic chain and the 
value chain. In part, we do this is because of the historic functional 
separation between production / manufacturing and distribution / 
transportation, although this is an epistemological divide that has been 
superceded by economic globalisation (Hall et al, forthcoming). The 
question for ports, and the city-regions that host them, is which chain or 
chains might they seek to insert themselves into, recognising that there may 
be trade-offs between different chains. For example, greater port throughput 
(in a logistics chain) need not necessarily translate into greater local 
economic activity (in a value chain); indeed, modern ports may impose 
negative externalities on their host cities without providing commensurate 
local employment and other economic benefits (Campbell, 1993). 
 
The over-arching point is that recognising that ports are elements in global 
supply chains severely complicates the scalar and bounding dimensions of 
the analytical and policy task. To begin answering the question, which link 
in which chain, we propose an ideal-typical framework that cuts across three 
spatial scales (port, port-city and nation), and identifies various actors 
seeking to insert themselves into, integrate activities along, and secure 
dominance within two types of value chain (logistic and value chains). The 
framework is summarised in Table 1; we have included a series of examples 
of the strategies that might be employed with respect to each. The case study 
that follows will illustrate how a variety of actors acting at different scales 
have used these strategies to insert Durban into global automobile supply 
chains. We show that conflict results not only from the tensions within or 
between competing value and logistics chains, but particularly from the 
tensions between parallel local and national decision-making arenas. 
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Table 1: Typology of supply chain strategies at different scales, with examples 
 
  Logistics chains Value chains 
Insertion Attract lines through 
concessions, leases 
On- or near-dock value-
added activity 
Integration Improved on-dock 
information systems 
Integrate on-dock with 
overall supply chain 
information systems 
Port (ie. on- or 
near-dock and 
terminal 
facility) 
Dominance Specialised and 
dedicated terminal 
Unique on- or near-dock 
processing facilities 
Insertion Local road 
connections 
Export promotion 
Integration Backhaul cooperation Local cluster strategy 
Port-city (ie. 
immediate port 
hinterland) 
Dominance Transport industry 
cluster strategy 
Develop immobile 
capacities 
Insertion Long-distance (rail) 
service and 
infrastructure 
Inward investment 
attraction 
Integration Regional corridor 
strategies 
National cluster strategy 
Nation (ie. 
beyond port-
city) 
Dominance Transshipment hub  Strategic trade policy 
 
 
AUTOMOBILES AND DURBAN: A CASE STUDY 
 
We use the conceptual framework to understand the dynamic relationship 
between the Port of Durban, city and national governments, and the 
automotive sector in the Durban region and elsewhere in South Africa. Three 
crucial features of the case study should be noted at the outset. First, the case 
is one of a port that enjoys an effective monopoly over the majority of 
containerised cargo movements through southern Africa. Second, the port 
forms part of a national parastatal organisation which remains relatively 
centralised despite the overall trend towards devolution in post-Apartheid 
South Africa. And third, the South African state at both national and local 
levels maintains a developmental stance with respect to the automotive 
industry. 
 
The section begins with a brief introduction to the automobile sector in 
Durban and the development of the port in the City. This is then followed 
with a discussion of changes in the national economy with an emphasis on 
trends in the automotive sector.  The case study then looks specifically at 
automotive logistics chain and value chain issues that have arisen in Durban 
in the past decade. 
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Background to the auto sector and the Port of Durban 
The Port of Durban has been South Africa’s premier maritime trade facility 
since relatively early in the twentieth century.  However, it was through the 
country’s post World War II industrialisation that the Port of Durban secured 
substantial and ongoing state investment, aimed initially at cultivating it as 
the primary port serving the country’s economic mining and industrial 
heartland (in what is today the Gauteng Province).  While South Africa’s 
mining-dominated economy and state import-substitution related policies 
encouraged economic development in the interior of the country, the 
development of large-scale industrial districts in proximity to the Port of 
Durban did attract significant industrial investment to the coastal city.  
Whilst Durban had a limited presence in automobile components and 
assembly in this early post-war period, it was with substantial commitments 
in investments from the firm that was ultimately to become Toyota South 
Africa (during the late 1960s and early 1970s) that it could be said that 
Durban was developing a cluster of automotive production activities.  These 
were almost entirely connected with production for the domestic market.  In 
fact the license conditions under which Toyota South Africa (TSA) operated 
specifically excluded them from exporting other than to handful of very 
limited consumption markets in southern and eastern Africa. 
 
By 1981, TSA had established its dominance in the domestic market as the 
primary producer of passenger and light commercial vehicles, dominance in 
total new vehicle sales and total production volume that it maintains to this 
day.  Both Toyota’s scale of output (in relative South African terms) and the 
considerable range in vehicle platforms that it produced further encouraged 
development of a component supplier base, primarily in Durban, but also in 
other regions of the country.  However, despite the steady growth of 
localised components suppliers during the period of the 1970s and 1980s, 
TSA’s growing production volumes remained very closely linked to its 
ability to import the bulk of its components through the nearby Port of 
Durban.  These inputs supported Toyota’s scale and range of production that 
was central to the company’s ability to maintain its domestic dominance in a 
variety of product sub-markets. 
 
What then were the logistic and value chain issues in this “pre-global” 
context?  In the first instance the highly protected production environment, 
including various forms of transport and production subsidies, allowed for 
considerable protection for producers from the price, quality and delivery 
pressures that are de rigueur in today’s globalised production and market 
environments.  This orientation towards relatively uncompetitive domestic 
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markets reduced the attention paid to logistics and supply chain management 
within firms. For the most part, the transport infrastructure at the Port of 
Durban, provided sufficient capacity and acceptable service. Of course, the 
trend towards containerisation, and attendant increases in the size of vessels, 
was beginning to signal the need for new investment and new approaches to 
port management.  Nevertheless, for much of this period there was limited 
pressure from port users and low responsiveness from port decision making 
structures with regard to performance. A similar lack of responsiveness in 
rail and falling performance standards led many businesses to shift long-haul 
land transport from rail to road (MSA, 1998). 
 
The inward-looking, centralised orientation of the South African economy, 
especially under apartheid, exacerbated in Durban what might otherwise 
have been regarded as the normal tensions between port and city: 
“(t)here has been little attempt at harmonisation of local and national 
interests, of city and port policy and practice. Indeed this has often 
resulted in direct conflict between the economic policy 
implementation plans of the city authorities and the views of the port 
authorities.  It results in crucially absent institutional linkages 
between the port, city and local industrial sectors.  This fundamental 
fault line governs and fractures the ability of the city to locate and 
take advantage of itself as a dynamic port city. The city is only half a 
port city, and the port only half related to the city” (Morris et al, 
2002: 110). 
 
The combined effect of domestic recession during the late 1980s and the 
process of economic reform initiated by the Apartheid government in this 
period, in a desperate attempt at securing its survival, thrust South African 
businesses into an environment of rapidly escalating competition and 
reduced government protection.  Even in sectors which were not directly 
affected by rapid tariff reductions, the extended domestic recession required 
that they seek opportunities in export markets.  This soon led to a much 
greater appreciation, at least in the private sector, of the importance for firms 
of inserting themselves into, achieving integration efficiencies along, and 
securing dominance within global supply chains. 
 
The context of national economic restructuring: 1994 and beyond 
In the years since the ending of Apartheid, South Africa’s economic 
structure has undergone substantial change.  Economic restructuring was 
encouraged by government through the adoption of an export oriented policy 
framework in the context of conservative macro-economic management – 
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presented in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR, 
1996).  Figure 1 illustrates that during the mid 1990s through to 2003, 
services-related sectors and those activities connected with transport showed 
the most rapid annual average growth in Gross Value Added.  Conversely, 
the mining sector’s contribution to Gross Value Added declined during this 
period. The growth performance of manufacturing, whilst positive was 
limited to less than two percent. In an important structural shift, the share of 
gross value added by the transportation sector increased from 9 percent to 12 
percent in just 7 years. 
 
Figure 1: South African Gross Value Added (GVA) annual average growth, 1996-03 
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Source: Economic Development Unit, eThekwini Municipality, 2004. 
 
South Africa’s export performance is reflected in this restructuring process 
and there has been steady growth in the proportion of exports to Gross 
Domestic Product in the past decade (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: South African exports as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
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Source: Economic Development Unit, eThekwini Municipality, 2004. 
 
In relation to export performance the main driver has been manufacturing 
(although exports of services are also beginning to be of some significance).  
The automotive sector in particular has been a key element of South Africa’s 
export growth performance (Barnes at al, 2003). 
 
South Africa’s economic restructuring process in the early 1990s was 
heavily influenced by dominant global policy trends at the time, often 
referred to as the Washington Consensus.  Countries of the developing world 
were encouraged to withdraw state interventions in terms of subsidies, tariffs 
and exchange controls in exchange for open trade and reciprocal access to 
the European and North American markets.  The automotive sector in South 
Africa was not immune to these changes.  In fact, “duty levels on completely 
built up vehicles (CBUs) fell from 115 per cent in 1995 to 40 per cent in 
2002 and are scheduled to reach 25 per cent by 2012. Tariffs on completely 
knocked down (CKD) components are lower still” (Lorentzen et al, 2004: 7). 
However, despite the commitment to trade liberalisation there was also a 
commitment by the Department of Trade and Industry to avoid potential 
pitfalls of de-industrialisation from rapid tariff adjustments (Barnes et al, 
2003). One of the manifestations of that commitment was the Motor 
Industry Development Programme (MIDP), formulated by the government 
together with key industry role players and launched in 1995.  The MIDP is 
planned to expire in 2012, although it may end in 2010 depending on trade 
agreements. 
 
The MIDP sought to encourage consolidation of domestic production around 
the output of a reduced range of vehicles (for each Own Equipment 
Manufacturer or OEM), thus allowing firms to harness export-level 
economies of scale in production. Through exporting these vehicles the 
OEMs would then be entitled to earn duty credits to import a considerably 
greater range of models from production sites in other parts of the globe.  In 
other words, domestic assemblers were encouraged to insert into global 
supply chains.  
 
These policy adjustments were deemed favourable by the OEMs and they 
began, one-by-one, to take advantage of the opportunity to build South 
Africa into their global operations. According to Barnes et al (2003), the 
automobile sector grew rapidly between 1994 and 2002, doubling its export 
to output ratio and accounting for an increasing share of output value, gross 
value added and manufacturing employment. As a result of the combined 
effects of the MIDP and the depreciation of the Rand, the share of the 
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automobile sector of total manufacturing sales grew from 9.7 percent in 
1994 to 12.8 percent in 2003.” (Lorentzen et al, 2004: 8) Growth in 
automobile sector exports and imports was accompanied by rapid growth in 
automobile logistics. While vehicle production overall increased after 1998, 
production for the domestic market has continued to fall: a greater portion of 
local demand is being met by imports, at the same time that exports have 
grown (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: SA passenger vehicle production, exports and imports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Source: Reproduced from Barnes J, Kaplinksy R and Morris, 2003: p 9 – originally from NAAMSA. 
 
As intended by the designers of the MIDP, the growth trend in vehicle 
production, imports and exports, also carried through into components 
production as can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: SA Automotive component output by value 
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Source: Reproduced from Barnes and Johnson (2004: 8) 
 
One notable early MIDP beneficiary was VWSA, which had been exporting 
Jetta’s to China since 1991, but perhaps the most prominent MIDP success 
was BMW, the German luxury-car manufacturer. BMW were first 
assembled in South Africa from CKD ‘kits’ from 1968; in 1973 BMW South 
Africa established the first BMW assembly plant outside Germany in 
Rosslyn, north-west of Pretoria. In 1994, the first exports were sent to 
Australia, and in 1996, with a R1bn investment, the plant became “BMW 
World Plant, Rosslyn”, an integrated part of the global production system. In 
1999, a new vehicle distribution center opened at the plant, and in 2002, 
approximately 80 percent of output was being exported. Whilst both VW 
and Daimler-Chrysler export through Eastern Cape ports, the Port of Durban 
focuses on serving a role as the main import channel and the primary export 
channel for BMW and Toyota. Ford also now exports the Focus to Europe 
through Durban.  
 
The Durban automotive sector  
The automotive sector in the greater Durban region was heavily influenced 
by these changes.  Local component producers did enjoy some growth in 
demand for output from domestic OEMs, and in some cases orders to supply 
into global production operations. While these benefits were significant, the 
largest single buyer of components produced in Durban – Toyota – at first 
did not seek to participate in the MIDP.  Instead Toyota purchased export 
credits from components producers and in turn used these to increase its 
imports of a greater range of vehicles for sale on the domestic market. 
However, for much of the period under consideration, domestic demand 
remained very flat, and Toyota found that importing competitors were 
cutting into its historic premium in South African small and mid-range 
passenger car markets.  
 
Hence, by 2000 Toyota South Africa (TSA) had announced that a majority 
of the local business had been acquired by Toyota Manufacturing 
Corporation of Japan (TMC) and that the Durban plant would begin to 
feature in Toyota’s global production system.1  This insertion of the local 
Toyota operation in the firms’ global supply chain – achieved by adjusting 
the licensing and ownership arrangements - was accompanied by a series of 
actions to integrate, secure and upgrade both value and logistics chains. To 
take full advantage of the MIDP restructuring, TSA had to export. To export 
they had to renegotiate license agreements with TMC of Japan.2  In turn, 
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TMC chose to increase its shareholding in TSA and invest in new assembly 
lines, all geared towards export. 
 
In preparation for these changes, TSA made it clear to various levels of 
government that TMC required certain policy signals to convince it to move 
beyond adjusting the license agreement and taking ownership, into actually 
investing. First, national-level endorsement was required; this came in the 
form of a series of Japanese and South African government ministerial 
exchanges and visits from 1998 to 2000. Second, a commitment from local 
government to be responsive to local infrastructure and land acquisition 
requests; this came in the form of direct contact with the executive of the 
metropolitan government, expedited planning and building approval for a 
catalytic converter plant, a private road/bridge link to the rail head in 
Prospecton, and better signage and street lighting. Third, TSA indicated that 
they needed a plan for resolving delays in container handling in the port, and 
more information about plans for the newly opened automobile terminal. For 
both of these, the firm looked to the city government to put pressure on the 
public port authority.  
 
TSA and TMC also began working together to integrate the supply chain by 
improving quality and delivery standards on all sorts of levels – in plant 
design, in the feasibility study for the catalytic converter plant (which 
opened in 2000 as the majority TMC-owned Catalyer), and in background 
work with component suppliers. The work with suppliers was helped 
significantly by the formation by local components firms of the 
Benchmarking Club, and subsequently, the Durban Auto Cluster.  This 
initiative was the result of proactive intervention by local actors, including 
suppliers, the local university, and municipal government (see Lorentzen at 
al, 2004; and Morris and Robbins, 2004). 
 
In 1997, in response to the slowdown in the South African economy and in 
anticipation of further rationalisation at Toyota, local suppliers began 
working together to improve their competitiveness and use their collective 
expertise to deal with various challenges relating to skills, logistics and 
supplier development. In 1998 they formed a Benchmarking Club, with 
financial support from the Department of Trade and Industry3, British 
government (ODA/DFID), and in 1999, from the Durban Metropolitan 
Council. Between 1998 and 2001, firms participating in the processes 
around the cluster and related benchmarking activities saw average 
improvements in the inventory days of 32.8 percent, of the lead times by 9.9 
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percent and an average improvement in reducing customer return rates by 62 
percent (Barnes et al, 2003: p 11).4 
 
In 1999, in response to additional pressure from Toyota to further upgrade 
the supply chain and recognising that the existing membership (of just 12 
first-tier suppliers) was too limited, the Club initiated a study to determine 
whether there was wider interest in a collaborative upgrading effort, without 
tampering with the existing benchmarking exercise. Durban city government 
sponsored a workshop in 2000 to present results of study, where it was 
revealed that a number of firms in Durban and other parts of KwaZulu-Natal 
province were eager to be part of such a process. In December 2000, the 
Durban Auto Cluster was launched, with layers of membership 
arrangements with varying membership fees. The City sponsored a handful 
of irregular / peripheral / family-owned suppliers, since membership fees 
were substantial. At formation, the Durban Auto Cluster adopted four 
programs: to the Benchmarking Club for highest level members was added a 
supplier development working group, a human resource development group, 
and a logistics working group. Later, a specific program for black-owned 
peripheral firms was added. 
 
The agenda of the logistics working group revolved around both maritime 
and landside issues. The landside concerns are an example of logistics chain 
integration, and entailed greater coordination between Toyota and the 
suppliers on road haulage for parts delivery. Toyota was sending trucks to 
Port Elizabeth to collect parts, while Durban-based suppliers were sending 
parts to Eastern Cape OEMs (VW and Mercedes). Collaboration resulted in 
significant back-haul cost savings. 
 
On the maritime side, while some concerns did revolve around eliminating 
inefficiencies through greater logistics chain integration, they also concerned 
the uncompetitive local port services industry; in other words, they also 
revolved around issues of logistics chain dominance. Both Toyota and its 
suppliers felt they were getting poor service and highly variable pricing. The 
logistics working group put some collective pressure on the South African 
Revenue Service (customs), and local clearing and forwarding agents to 
simplify documentation and make transactions cheaper. However, many 
smaller shippers also felt that they were paying a premium on containers, 
and so they established a consortium (shippers association) to improve 
prices for small shippers. The group negotiated improved and consistent 
rates, in turn, for the European, North American, Asian, and Latin American 
routes. Finally, the group tried, without much success to pressure the port 
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management to improve container terminal operations overall in terms of 
productivity, lost boxes, damage, delays, and so on. 
 
The group was supported by lots of media attention on the port’s problems, 
and even succeeded in having City government pass a resolution in 2000 
calling on the port to improve its operations, and to work with city. This 
pressure did not result in much improvement. 
 
Auto shipments and the Port of Durban 
It would be unfair to blame local port operations management for all the 
problems at the Port of Durban during this period.  The parastatal 
corporation managing all South African ports, Portnet, was being split into 
the National Ports Authority (NPA, the landlord, and portside and maritime 
services provider) and the South African Port Operations (SAPO, the 
terminal operator) units.  However, growth in container volumes through the 
late 1990s in excess of 10 percent per year soon exposed inadequate 
investment plans and weak management at the Port. Delays in loading and 
offloading containers were aggravated by landside congestion problems and 
the service shortcomings in the rail network operated by Spoornet. In some 
cases this resulted in very public disagreements between the main parties, in 
particular over the handling delays at the main container terminal. 
 
The late 1990s witnessed a number of short-term investment projects by 
Portnet and its successors, the NPA and SAPO.  These mainly involved the 
expansion of handling facilities at the main container terminal to increase 
capacity to just over one million TEUs, and the construction of a dedicated 
car terminal.  The latter resulted from interactions between major vehicle 
importers, Pretoria-based BMW, the Department of Trade and Industry and 
the National Port Authority.  The terminal which opened in 1998 with 3 500 
bays, was initially designed to handle 90 000 units annually (Arkin, 2005: 
56). It was deemed feasible based on projections of growing imports and 
further supported by BMW plans to export the 3-series car to north America, 
Australasia, Europe and Japan (Barnes at al, 2003: p 8). 
 
The new automobile terminal in Durban reflected the ability of BMW, a 
shipper with its main production activities located outside the port-city, to 
secure preferential access to port planning and investment. As one of the 
first automobile firms to explicitly adopt the MIDP, BMW had cultivated 
close ties with the national government and was able to secure substantial 
cabinet-level support. In many ways, the BMW expansions, including the 
Durban auto port, became symbolic of the newly invigorated 
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‘developmental’ state.5 Apparently the automobile terminal was funded 
without explicit approval from the Portnet Board. 
 
The planning, location, design and scale of the initial automobile terminal 
reflected BMWs needs, but certainly not those of the soon to be exporting 
Durban-based Toyota. The decision to build the automobile terminal was 
taken at exactly the same time as two joint port-city planning processes were 
under way. The Port-City forum, begun erratically in 1997, and this was 
followed by the associated South Industrial Basin6 (SIB) planning process 
which was actively developing a grander vision for an automotive logistics 
park with supply chain value adding activities (ie. customisation, 
accessorisation and associated space for parts suppliers). The SIB process 
was funded in part by the national government Department of Trade and 
Industry, yet Portnet bypassed this process to go ahead with the new 
automobile terminal. The case for locating an auto terminal at the SIB end of 
the port is strong, since the SIB accounts for 29.2 percent of all the 
automotive components employment in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, and 
half of all the firms with turnover of more than R300m per annum (Barnes 
and Johnson, 2004). 
 
Instead Portnet chose for the automobile terminal a location on the northern 
side of the port, adjacent to the Central Business District. Cars for export 
from Toyota have to go to far side of port, through downtown and on public 
roads, facing insurance concerns, congestion and delays. While the terminal 
is served by rail, this involves shunting from the rail head adjacent to the 
SIB. Yet BMW is the only auto terminal shipper that makes use of rail 
(Arikin, 2004: 57). Finally, the auto terminal soon ran into capacity 
constraints, necessitating some very expensive additional investments. These 
involved doubling the number of parking spaces to 7 000 by building a 
multi-storey parking garage, and the building of a dedicated bridge over the 
rail lines. These were completed in 2004. 
 
Notwithstanding these problems with the planning of Durban’s car terminal, 
it has witnessed an increase in unit throughput from just over 40,000 units in 
1998 to over 200,000 units in 2004 (or by 79 percent in seven short years; 
see Table 2). Today, there are over 20 car carrier calls per month, with all 
major global car carrier lines calling (Hall&Olivier, 2005); HUAL calls most 
frequently, but the terminal is also visited by WWL/Eukor, NYK, MOL and 
K-Line. In general it appears that there has been satisfaction with the 
performance of the facility (Arkin, 2005) although there remains 
considerable uncertainty as to the way forward in terms of expansion to meet 
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future demand.  Land use and congestion-based conflicts between downtown 
business interests and local government, and the port, remain unresolved.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Durban Car Terminal Through Traffic 
 
Year Imports Exports Total 
1998 37,076 5227 42303 
1999 31,797 6904 38701 
2000 60,621 19666 80287 
2001 66,394 41800 108194 
2002 68,371 48723 117094 
2003 83,880 53477 139189 
2004 152,580 46193 201827 
Source: SAPO, via Arkin (2004). 
 
Toyota and the future of auto operations in the Port of Durban 
Although its intentions were not made public at the time, Toyota began to 
engage the NPA in discussions in 2000 in an effort to gauge responses to 
projected increased export volumes from its Durban plant. Toyota was not 
impressed with the initial response, and as was the case with container 
terminal operations, the firm looked to City government to put pressure on 
the port to be more responsive. Indeed, Toyota felt compelled to explore a 
variety of highly unattractive alternatives, such as using a private terminal 
on Maydon Wharf in amongst bulk and breakbulk cargo, or even placing 
export cars in boxes. Toyota made their disquiet known through informal 
channels as they do not like to engage on issues publicly. At this stage 
Toyota was still only committing to an export figure in 2002 of 30 000 
Corollas to Autralasia by 2004. 
 
However, it has become clear that Toyota was simply testing the waters and 
ensuring the robustness of its systems as during the course of 2004 the 
company announced that it intended to introduce two other export-focused 
assembly lines. According to an industry expert, the decision has been made 
to increase Toyota production in Durban to the order of world status, or 
approximately 250,000 units per year by 2010 (Barnes, 2005). Of these, 
between 120,000 and 140,000 units will be exported, with most going to 
Europe. It is highly unlikely that the existing automobile terminal port 
facility will be able to accommodate this growth. 
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More recently, the NPA acceded to a request from Toyota and the City of 
Durban (eThekwini Municipality) to set up a joint task team to assess future 
development options.  This was deemed necessary by both Toyota and the 
Municipality due the fact that the location of the present facility close to the 
commercial centre of Durban’s inner city has resulted in congestion 
problems that would only get worse as Toyota increased its export volume.  
The findings of the investigation have not yet been made public, but 
according to an eThekwini Municipal official (Thaver, 2005) it is understood 
that consensus was not achieved and that the NPA is considering going 
ahead with its preferred in situ expansion option despite reservations from 
the City and Toyota. 
 
Sadly, this is hardly out of character for the NPA. While the NPA has spent 
the better part of the last four years developing a Port Masterplan for 
Durban, it has only been during the course of 2005 that external stakeholders 
have had access to the plan details. The fact that it was developed in 
isolation from other key stakeholders is reflective of ongoing governance 
challenges of a parastatal system which still carries the baggage of 
hierarchically imposed solutions that were the order of the day under 
Apartheid. At the same time the intransigence of the Durban port authorities 
reflects, in no small measure, the ports’ dominance within the supply chains 
that are routed through it. The distances between ports in South Africa are so 
great and the capacity of the entire system is so constrained, that the Port of 
Durban enjoys an effective monopoly that remains unchallenged. For now, 
and for the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to Durban for the 
shipment of either parts or vehicles with an origin or destination from 
Durban to Gauteng. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: REFLECTING ON SUPPLY CHAIN ISSUES IN 
THE DURBAN CONTEXT 
 
We began this paper by embracing the notion that ports and port-cities 
should seek to insert themselves into supply chains. However, what our case 
study of inserting Durban in global automobile supply chains has shown is 
that this is a complex process, involving multiple actors and chains. For this 
reason we asked which link, in which chain? We have argued for an 
approach to supply chain insertion which recognises that actors in chains 
face both internal and external competitive / dominance and cooperative / 
integrative pressures. We have also argued that supply chain insertion plays 
out across multiple scales. Hence our conceptual framework differentiates 
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between logistics and value chains, and between port, local and national 
scale actors and their (often divergent) goals. 
 
In the case of Durban, there has been some success in inserting the port into 
the logistics chain of one exporter, while improving facilities for automobile 
importers. However, this supply chain insertion was driven by a non-local 
shipper taking advantage of a successful national industrial strategy, and was 
implemented on the docks by a centrally-controlled port authority. In other 
words, the port authority did not make it happen, and could not have made it 
happen, alone. And it has come at a significant local cost, most notably in 
the lost opportunities to accelerate the insertion of Durban into Toyota’s 
global value chain. 
 
In a general sense, we may conclude that there are two forms of conflict 
here. First, we have supply chains in competition with each other to 
dominate particular (critical) supply chain resource, in this instance the 
attention and facilities of the national port authority. Second, we have a port 
seeking to insert itself into particular extra-local logistics chains, and a port-
city seeking prominence for value chains embedded in the local economy. 
The shift to a world dominated by supply chains will not eliminate the 
problems of highly localised tensions between port and city; indeed in some 
cases it may exacerbate them. 
 
Further, it makes a difference which supply chains are at play in a particular 
context. Luckily for Durban, Toyota, is a patient, persistent and growing 
player in the global automobile industry. Toyota and its suppliers arguably 
have far more interest in logistics chain insertion and integration because of 
the way in which Toyota (throughout the world) organises its production. 
TSA already sources a greater share of it parts locally than any other South 
African OEM, and as it expands production for export, it is committed to 
further increasing the share of content sourced locally.  In order to improve 
component quality and quantity the firm has taken an interest in some of its 
major suppliers, and encouraged others to do so themselves. Furthermore, 
unlike most other South African OEMs, Toyota does not do preassembly, 
relying on a more complex ‘just-in-time’ system that requires close attention 
to logistics integration. All this provides some grounds for optimism that 
supply chain problems in Durban will eventually be resolved. 
 
The situation we have described might have been very different if we were 
dealing with a port authority more responsive to local economic actors. For 
this reason we conclude by noting that the thorny issues of port governance 
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and of improved city-port coordination remain unresolved. In large part, the 
scalar tensions playing out on the Durban waterfront are a consequence of 
the flip-flopping of national ports policy. The post-Apartheid government’s 
first attempt to address transport infrastructure investment backlogs, Moving 
South Africa (1998), failed to take root. Similarly, government has now 
backed away from the National Commercial Ports Bill which contained an 
initial commitment to separate the ports from the national transportation 
parastatal, Transnet, as well as to allow terminal concessions. Instead, since 
the early 2000s, government has endorsed what is today the status quo, 
namely the NPA and SAPO operating as two separate divisions under 
Transnet. Most recently government unveiled a National Logistics Strategy, 
which recommends reconfiguring and harmonising institutions and 
regulations, and allowing more competition in transport sector. However, 
this national policy has very little to say about effective action at the local 
level to address logistic and value chain integration.  From our perspective, 
this strategy is unlikely to do enough to allow the port and the city of Durban 
to answer, in a timely fashion, the next time they are asked, which link, in 
which chain. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. TMC might have considered two alternative strategies, both 
presenting major problems. First, TMC could have left TSA’s 
licensing arrangement unaltered, hence effectively denying it the 
option of participating in the MIDP. This would likely have resulted 
in TSA’s decline in the small, but significant domestic market. 
Second, it could have allowed TSA to export more vehicles 
(especially low-volume / non-global standard models) to an expanded 
number of markets, but this option would run counter to TMC’s 
global strategy. This option would have had important logistics 
consequences, implying many smaller loads with diverse overland 
(i.e. southern African) and maritime (i.e. west and east coast African) 
destinations. 
 
2. TSA stopped producing the Camry, which was now imported from 
Australia. It also began importing the RAV4 and Prado, and began 
components exports with MIDP tariff benefits. TSA still has the 
greatest model range of all South African OEMs, producing 
commercial trucks, a low-end hatch-back (Tazz), mid-sized sedan 
(Corrola), higher end hatch-back (RunX), minvan / taxi (HiAce), and 
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light truck (the Hilux).  It is now starting to produce a new hybrid 
vehicle (MPV), but may soon halt HiAce production. 
 
3. The DTI and various national industry associations were involved in 
discussions about a national industrial and cluster strategies at 
approximately the same time. While these discussions did lead to 
adjustments in the MIDP that were instrumental in BMW’s expansion, 
local suppliers set up their own forum in part because they did not find 
the national discussions particularly useful. 
 
4. These figures apply for firms participating in the initiative from both 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. 
 
5. This is not to say that BMW was spared the efficiency concerns faced 
by other Transnet users. The firm still uses road rather than rail to 
bring containerised parts from Durban to bypass the City Deep inland 
port, and even use Port Elizabeth and Cape Town to avoid the delays 
at the Durban container terminal. 
 
6. The Southern Industrial Basin extends from the south end of the port 
to south of the Durban International Airport, and includes Prospecton, 
Jacobs, Mobeni and Seaview. Prospecton is home to Toyota SA. 
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